On dream [excerpts] – Freud

It is the process of displacement which is chiefly responsible for our being unable to discover or recognize the -thoughts in the -content, unless we understand the reason for their distortion. Nevertheless, the -thoughts are also submitted to another and milder sort of transformation, which leads to our discovering a new achievement on the part of the -work – one, however, which is easily intelligible. The -thoughts which we first come across as we proceed with our analysis often strike us by the unusual form in which they are expressed; they are not clothed in the prosaic language usually employed by our thoughts, but are on the contrary represented symbolically by means of similes and metaphors, in images resembling those of poetic speech. There is no difficulty in accounting for the constraint imposed upon the form in which the -thoughts are expressed. The manifest content of s consists for the most part in pictorial situations; and the -thoughts must accordingly be submitted in the first place to a treatment which will make them suitable for a representation of this kind. If we imagine ourselves faced by the problem of representing the arguments in a political leading article or the speeches of counsel before a court of law in a series of pictures, we shall easily understand the modifications which must necessarily be carried out by the -work owing to considerations of representability in the content of the .

The psychical material of the -thoughts habitually includes recollections of impressive experiences – not infrequently dating back to early childhood -which are thus themselves perceived as a rule as situations having a visual subject-matter. Wherever the possibility arises, this portion of the -thoughts exercises a determining influence upon the form taken by the content of the ; it constitutes, as it were, a nucleus of crystallization, attracting the material of the -thoughts to itself and thus affecting their distribution. The situation in a is often nothing other than a modified repetition, complicated by interpolations, of an impressive experience of this kind; on the other hand, faithful and straightforward reproductions of real scenes only rarely appear in s.

The content of s, however, does not consist entirely of situations, but also includes disconnected fragments of visual images, speeches and even bits of unmodified thoughts. It may therefore perhaps be of interest to enumerate very briefly the modes of representation available to the -work for reproducing the -thoughts in the peculiar form of expression necessary in s.

The -thoughts which we arrive at by means of analysis reveal themselves as a psychical complex of the most intricate possible structure. Its portions stand in the most manifold logical relations to one another: they represent foreground and background, conditions, digressions and illustrations, chains of evidence and counter-arguments. Each train of thought is almost invariably accompanied by its contradictory counterpart. This material lacks none of the characteristics that are familiar to us from our waking thinking. If now all of this is to be turned into a , the psychical material will be submitted to a pressure which will condense it greatly, to an internal fragmentation and displacement which will, as it were, create new surfaces, and to a selective operation in favour of those portions of it which are the most appropriate for the construction of situations. If we take into account the genesis of the material, a process of this sort deserves to be described as a ‘regression’. In the course of this transformation, however, the logical links which have hitherto held the psychical material together are lost. It is only, as it were, the substantive content of the -thoughts that the -work takes over and manipulates. The restoration of the connections which the -work has destroyed is a task which has to be performed by the work of analysis.

The modes of expression open to a may therefore be qualified as meagre by comparison with those of our intellectual speech; nevertheless a need not wholly abandon the possibility of reproducing the logical relations present in the -thoughts. On the contrary, it succeeds often enough in replacing them by formal characteristics in its own texture.

In the first place, s take into account the connection which undeniably exists between all the portions of the -thoughts by combining the whole material into a single situation. They reproduce logical connection by approximation in time and space, just as a painter will represent all the poets in a single group in a picture of Parnassus. It is true that they were never in fact assembled on a single mountain-top; but they certainly form a conceptual group. s carry this method of reproduction down to details; and often when they show us two elements in the -content close together, this indicates that there is some specially intimate connection between what correspond to them among the -thoughts. […]


We have not yet come to the end of our consideration of the -work. In addition to condensation, displacement and pictorial arrangement of the psychical material, we are obliged to assign it yet another activity, though this is not to be found in operation in every . I shall not deal exhaustively with this part of the -work, and will therefore merely remark that the easiest way of forming an idea of its nature is to suppose – though the supposition probably does not meet the facts – that it only comes into operation AFTER the -content has already been constructed. Its function would then consist in arranging the constituents of the in such a way that they form an approximately connected whole, a -composition. In this way the is given a kind of facade (though this does not, it is true, hide its content at every point), and thus receives a first, preliminary interpretation, which is supported by interpolations and slight modifications. Incidentally, this revision of the -content is only possible if it is not too punctiliously carried out; nor does it present us with anything more than a glaring misunderstanding of the -thoughts. Before we start upon the analysis of a we have to clear the ground of this attempt at an interpretation.

The motive for this part of the -work is particularly obvious. Considerations of intelligibility are what lead to this final revision of a ; and this reveals the origin of the activity. It behaves towards the -content lying before it just as our normal psychical activity behaves in general towards any perceptual content that may be presented to it. It understands that content on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even at the moment of perceiving it, on the presupposition of its being intelligible; in so doing it runs a risk of falsifying it, and in fact, if it cannot bring it into line with anything familiar, is a prey to the strangest misunderstandings. As is well known, we are incapable of seeing a series of unfamiliar signs or of hearing a succession of unknown words, without at once falsifying the perception from considerations of intelligibility, on the basis of something already known to us.

s which have undergone a revision of this kind at the hands of a psychical activity completely analogous to waking thought may be described as ‘well-constructed’. In the case of other s this activity has completely broken down; no attempt even has been made to arrange or interpret the material, and, since after we have woken up we feel ourselves identical with this last part of the -work, we make a judgement that the was ‘hopelessly confused’. From the point of view of analysis, however, a that resembles a disordered heap of disconnected fragments is just as valuable as one that has been beautifully polished and provided with a surface. In the former case, indeed, we are saved the trouble of demolishing what has been superimposed upon the -content.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these -facades are nothing other than mistaken and somewhat arbitrary revisions of the -content by the conscious agency of our mental life. In the erection of a -facade use is not infrequently made of wishful phantasies which are present in the -thoughts in a pre-constructed form, and are of the same character as the appropriately named ‘day-s’ familiar to us in waking life. The wishful phantasies revealed by analysis in night-s often turn out to be repetitions or modified versions of scenes from infancy; thus in some cases the facade of the directly reveals the ’s actual nucleus, distorted by an admixture of other material.

The -work exhibits no activities other than the four that have already been mentioned. If we keep to the definition of ‘-work’ as the process of transforming the -thoughts into the -content, it follows that the -work is not creative, that it develops no phantasies of its own, that it makes no judgements and draws no conclusions; it has no functions whatever other than condensation and displacement of the material and its modification into pictorial form, to which must be added as a variable factor the final bit of interpretative revision. It is true that we find various things in the -content which we should be inclined to regard as a product of some other and higher intellectual function; but in every case analysis shows convincingly that these intellectual operations have already been performed in the -thoughts and have only been TAKEN OVER by the -content. A conclusion drawn in a is nothing other than the repetition of a conclusion in the -thoughts; if the conclusion is taken over into the unmodified, it will appear impeccable; if the -work has displaced it on to some other material, it will appear nonsensical. A calculation in the -content signifies nothing more than that there is a calculation in the -thoughts; but while the latter is always rational, a -calculation may produce the wildest results if its factors are condensed or if its mathematical operations are displaced on to other material. Not even the speeches that occur in the -content are original compositions; they turn out to be a hotchpotch of speeches made, heard or read, which have been revived in the -thoughts and whose wording is exactly reproduced, while their origin is entirely disregarded and their meaning is violently changed.


Having been made acquainted with the -work … we shall no doubt be inclined to pronounce it a quite peculiar psychical process, the like of which, so far as we are aware, does not exist elsewhere. It is as though we were carrying over on to the -work all the astonishment which used formerly to be aroused in us by its product, the . In fact, however, the -work is only the first to be discovered of a whole series of psychical processes, responsible for the generation of hysterical symptoms, of phobias, obsessions and delusions. Condensation and, above all, displacement are invariable characteristics of these other processes as well. Modification into a pictorial form, on the other hand, remains a peculiarity of the -work. If this explanation places s in a single series alongside the structures produced by psychical illness, this makes it all the more important for us to discover the essential determining conditions of such processes as those of -formation. We shall probably be surprised to hear that neither the state of sleep nor illness is among these indispensable conditions. A whole number of the phenomena of the everyday life of healthy people – such as forgetting, slips of the tongue, bungled actions and a particular class of errors – owe their origin to a psychical mechanism analogous to that of s and of the other members of the series. The heart of the problem lies in displacement, which is by far the most striking of the special achievements of the -work. If we enter deeply into the subject, we come to realize that the essential determining condition of displacement is a purely psychological one: something in the nature of a motive. One comes upon its track if one takes into consideration certain experiences which one cannot escape in analysing s. In analysing my specimen I was obliged to break off my report of the -thoughts . . . because, as I confessed, there were some among them which I should prefer to conceal from strangers and which I could not communicate to other people without doing serious mischief in important directions. I added that nothing would be gained if I were to choose another instead of that particular one with a view to reporting its analysis: I should come upon -thoughts which required to be kept secret in the case of every with an obscure or confused content. If, however, I were to continue the analysis on my own account, without any reference to other people (whom, indeed, an experience so personal as my cannot possibly have been intended to reach), I should eventually arrive at thoughts which would surprise me, whose presence in me I was unaware of, which were not only alien but also disagreeable to me, and which I should therefore feel inclined to dispute energetically, although the chain of thoughts running through the analysis insisted upon them remorselessly. There is only one way of accounting for this state of affairs, which is of quite universal occurrence; and that is to suppose that these thoughts really were present in my mind, and in possession of a certain amount of psychical intensity or energy, but that they were in a peculiar psychological situation, as a consequence of which they could not become conscious to me. (I describe this particular condition as one of ‘repression’.) We cannot help concluding, then, that there is a causal connection between the obscurity of the -content and the state of repression (inadmissibility to consciousness) of certain of the -thoughts, and that the had to be obscure so as not to betray the proscribed -thoughts. Thus we are led to the concept of a ‘-distortion’, which is the product of the -work and serves the purpose of dissimulation, that is, of disguise.


Hitherto philosophers have had no occasion to concern themselves with a psychology of repression. We may therefore be permitted to make a first approach to this hitherto unknown topic by constructing a pictorial image of the course of events in -formation. It is true that the schematic picture we have arrived at – not only from the study of s – is a fairly complicated one; but we cannot manage with anything simpler. Our hypothesis is that in our mental apparatus there are two thought-constructing agencies, of which the second enjoys the privilege of having free access to consciousness for its products, whereas the activity of the first is in itself unconscious and can only reach consciousness by way of the second. On the frontier between the two agencies, where the first passes over to the second, there is a censorship, which only allows what is agreeable to it to pass through and holds back everything else. According to our definition, then, what is rejected by the censorship is in a state of repression. Under certain conditions, of which the state of sleep is one, the relation between the strength of the two agencies is modified in such a way that what is repressed can no longer be held back. In the state of sleep this probably occurs owing to a relaxation of the censorship; when this happens it becomes possible for what has hitherto been repressed to make a path for itself to consciousness. Since, however, the censorship is never completely eliminated but merely reduced, the repressed material must submit to certain alterations which mitigate its offensive features. What becomes conscious in such cases is a compromise between the intentions of one agency and the demands of the other. Repression – relaxation of the censorship – the formation of a compromise, this is the fundamental pattern for the generation not only of s but of many other psychopathological structures; and in the latter cases too we may observe that the formation of compromises is accompanied by processes of condensation and displacement and by the employment of superficial associations, which we have become familiar with in the -work.

We have no reason to disguise the fact that in the hypothesis which we have set up in order to explain the -work a part is played by what might be described as a ‘daemonic’ element. We have gathered an impression that the formation of obscure s occurs as though one person who was dependent upon a second person had to make a remark which was bound to be disagreeable in the ears of this second one; and it is on the basis of this simile that we have arrived at the concepts of -distortion and censorship, and have endeavoured to translate our impression into a psychological theory which is no doubt crude but is at least lucid. Whatever it may be with which a further investigation of the subject may enable us to identify our first and second agencies, we may safely expect to find a confirmation of some correlate of our hypothesis that the second agency controls access to consciousness and can bar the first agency from such access.

When the state of sleep is over, the censorship quickly recovers its full strength; and it can now wipe out all that was won from it during the period of its weakness. This must be one part at least of the explanation of the forgetting of s, as is shown by an observation which has been confirmed on countless occasions. It not infrequently happens that during the narration of a or during its analysis a fragment of the -content which had seemed to be forgotten re-emerges. This fragment which has been rescued from oblivion invariably affords us the best and most direct access to the meaning of the . And that, in all probability, must have been the only reason for its having been forgotten, that is, for its having been once more suppressed.


No one who accepts the view that the censorship is the chief reason for -distortion will be surprised to learn from the results of -interpretation that most of the s of adults are traced back by analysis to erotic wishes. This assertion is not aimed at s with an undisguised sexual content, which are no doubt familiar to all ers from their own experience and are as a rule the only ones to be described as ‘sexual s’. Even s of this latter kind offer enough surprises in their choice of the people whom they make into sexual objects, in their disregard of all the limitations which the er imposes in his waking life upon his sexual desires, and by their many strange details, hinting at what are commonly known as ‘perversions’. A great many other s, however, which show no sign of being erotic in their manifest content, are revealed by the work of interpretation in analysis as sexual wish-fulfilments; and, on the other hand, analysis proves that a great many of the thoughts left over from the activity of waking life as ‘residues of the previous day’ only find their way to representation in s through the assistance of repressed erotic wishes.

There is no theoretical necessity why this should be so; but to explain the fact it may be pointed out that no other group of instincts has been submitted to such far-reaching suppression by the demands of cultural education, while at the same time the sexual instincts are also the ones which, in most people, find it easiest to escape from the control of the highest mental agencies. Since we have become acquainted with infantile sexuality, which is often so unobtrusive in its manifestations and is always overlooked and misunderstood, we are justified in saying that almost every civilized man retains the infantile forms of sexual life in some respect or other. We can thus understand how it is that repressed infantile sexual wishes provide the most frequent and strongest motive-forces for the construction of s.

There is only one method by which a which expresses erotic wishes can succeed in appearing innocently non-sexual in its manifest content. The material of the sexual ideas must not be represented as such, but must be replaced in the content of the by hints, allusions and similar forms of indirect representation. But, unlike other forms of indirect representation, that which is employed in s must not be immediately intelligible. The modes of representation which fulfil these conditions are usually described as ‘symbols’ of the things which they represent. Particular interest has been directed to them since it has been noticed that ers speaking the same language make use of the same symbols, and that in some cases, indeed, the use of the same symbols extends beyond the use of the same language. Since ers themselves are unaware of the meaning of the symbols they use, it is difficult at first sight to discover the source of the connection between the symbols and what they replace and represent. The fact itself, however, is beyond doubt, and it is important for the technique of -interpretation. For, with the help of a knowledge of -, it is possible to understand the meaning of separate elements of the content of a or separate pieces of a or in some cases even whole s, without having to ask the er for his associations. Here we are approaching the popular ideal of translating s and on the other hand are returning to the technique of interpretation used by the ancients, to whom -interpretation was identical with interpretation by means of symbols.

Although the study of -symbols is far from being complete, we are in a position to lay down with certainty a number of general statements and a quantity of special information on the subject. There are some symbols which bear a single meaning almost universally: thus the Emperor and Empress (or the King and Queen) stand for the parents, rooms represent women and their entrances and exits the openings of the body. The majority of -symbols serve to represent persons, parts of the body and activities invested with erotic interest; in particular, the genitals are represented by a number of often very surprising symbols, and the greatest variety of objects are employed to denote them symbolically. Sharp weapons, long and stiff objects, such as tree-trunks and sticks, stand for the male genital; while cupboards, boxes, carriages or ovens may represent the uterus. In such cases as these the tertium comparationis, the common element in these substitutions, is immediately intelligible; but there are other symbols in which it is not so easy to grasp the connection. Symbols such as a staircase or going upstairs to represent sexual intercourse, a tie or cravat for the male organ, or wood for the female one, provoke our unbelief until we can arrive at an understanding of the symbolic relation underlying them by some other means. Moreover a whole number of -symbols are bisexual and can relate to the male or female genitals according to the context.

Some symbols are universally disseminated and can be met with in all ers belonging to a single linguistic or cultural group; there are others which occur only within the most restricted and individual limits, symbols constructed by an individual out of his own ideational material. Of the former class we can distinguish some whose claim to represent sexual ideas is immediately justified by linguistic usage (such, for instance, as those derived from agri, e.g. ‘fertilization’ or ‘seed’) and others whose relation to sexual ideas appears to reach back into the very earliest ages and to the most obscure depths of our conceptual functioning. The power of constructing symbols has not been exhausted in our own days in the case of either of the two sorts of symbols which I have distinguished at the beginning of this paragraph. Newly discovered objects (such as airships) are, as we may observe, at once adopted as universally available sexual symbols.

It would, incidentally, be a mistake to expect that if we had a still profounder knowledge of - (of the language of s’) we could do without asking the er for his associations to the and go back entirely to the technique of -interpretation of antiquity. Quite apart from individual symbols and oscillations in the use of universal ones, one can never tell whether any particular element in the content of a is to be interpreted symbolically or in its proper sense, and one can be certain that the whole content of a is not to be interpreted symbolically. A knowledge of - will never do more than enable us to translate certain constituents of the -content, and will not relieve us of the necessity for applying the technical rules which I gave earlier. It will, however, afford the most valuable assistance to interpretation precisely at points at which the er’s associations are insufficient or fail altogether.

- is also indispensable to an understanding of what are known as ‘typical’ s, which are common to everyone, and of ‘recurrent’ s in individuals.

If the account I have given in this short discussion of the symbolic mode of expression in s appears incomplete, I can justify my neglect by drawing attention to one of the most important pieces of knowledge that we possess on this subject. - extends far beyond s: it is not peculiar to s, but exercises a similar dominating influence on representation in fairy-tales, myths and legends, in jokes and in folk-lore. It enables us to trace the intimate connections between s and these latter productions. We must not suppose that - is a creation of the -work; it is in all probability a characteristic of the unconscious thinking which provides the -work with the material for condensation, displacement and dramatization.

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